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Abstract 
Depending on the context at hand, people’s preference for receiving feedback might differ. Especially 
in allocation decisions that directly concern another individual, feedback from the affected person can 
have positive or negative value. We study such preferences in a laboratory experiment by eliciting the 
willingness-to-pay to receive or to avoid verbal feedback from subjects that were previously affected by 
an allocation decision. We find that most decision makers exhibit a positive willingness-to-pay for 
having control about whether feedback occurs or not. Specifically, decision makers that equally shared 
their endowment with the recipient revealed a positive willingness-to-pay for receiving, but not for 
avoiding feedback. By contrast, among decision makers that behaved selfishly, we identify both: 
subjects that were willing to pay for receiving and subjects that were willing to pay for avoiding 
feedback. The stated motivations indicate that curiosity, the desire to receive social approval and giving 
the recipient the chance to express his/her feelings are the main reasons for feedback acquisition, while 
shame and fear of negative feedback are the main reasons for avoidance. 
 
Highlights: 
• We measure the willingness-to-pay to get (avoid) feedback in allocation situations 
• Both preferences for acquisition and avoidance of feedback are observed 
• Curiosity, social (dis)approval and emotion expression explain the pattern 
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1. Introduction 
It is commonly observed that people have preferences for getting or avoiding feedback in 
various contexts. For example, people do not want to get to know the true results of a medical 
test they decided to do (e.g.,  Lyter et al. (1987)). In our study, we investigate, whether such 
behavior can also be found in allocation decisions, where the salience of a particular decision 
potentially affects self-image. Therefore, we conducted a simple two-stage experiment to 
examine how the valuation of verbal feedback depends on a subject´s previous behavior. In the 
first stage, subjects played a mini-dictator game (MDG) in which the decision maker could 
choose between a “fair” option and an “unfair” option. In the second stage, the dictator had to 
decide whether or not he/she prefers to receive feedback from the recipient. We conducted two 
treatments in order to measure the valuation for reception as well as for avoidance of feedback. 
In the former, participants had to pay to get feedback whereas in the latter participants had to 
pay to avoid feedback. 
 Our study contributes to the more recent literature on preferences for non-instrumental 
communication and non-instrumental information.1 For example, it has been shown that 
individuals tend to acquire costly but non-instrumental information for several reasons. 
Thereby, the most common motives are: the satisfaction of curiosity (Loewenstein, 1994), the 
pleasure of knowledge and insight (Karlsson et al., 2004), and reshaping their beliefs in a 
favorable manner (Eil and Rao, 2011; Karlsson et al., 2009).2 Likewise, individuals sometimes 
willfully ignore information about negative consequences of their own actions on others or on 
the environment (Dana et al., 2007; Feiler, 2014; Hertwig and Engel, 2016; Norgaard, 2006; 
Stoll-Kleemann et al., 2001).3 
 Our paper is not the first to examine communication in allocation situations.4 Xiao and 
Houser (2007) as well as Ellingsen and Johannesson (2008) found that the expectation of ex-
post verbal feedback from the recipient increases generosity in dictator games and concluded 
that communication influences behavior besides its instrumental content. Similarly, 
 
1 This literature contrasts the traditional economic view that individuals only care for information if it is 
instrumental, i.e., if it helps maximizing material payoff. Common examples refer to using information to optimize 
decision-making (Stigler, 1961) or to coordinate actions with others (Crawford and Sobel, 1982).  
2 Such results led to the conclusion, that information communication is not only valued for instrumental reasons, 
but directly enters an agent’s utility function (Bénabou and Tirole, 2006; Golman and Loewenstein, 2015; 
Loewenstein and Molnar, 2018). In a recent study, Alós-Ferrer et al. (2018) provide evidence that curiosity about 
the own performance can trump inequality aversion. Curiosity has also been found to contribute to explaining the 
endowment effect (van de Ven et al. (2005) 
3 Another related strand of literature is about the avoidance of instrumental information. This phenomenon is 
particularly known from the field of medicine, where patients sometimes choose not to take medical tests or avoid 
getting to know a test result, even when taking the test is not associated with material cost or when the result would 
lead to valuable information for future decisions (Lerman et al. (1996); Lerman (1999); Lyter et al. (1987)). 
4 In this study, we use the terms feedback, communication and information equivalently. 
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Langenbach (2016) and Bruttel et al. (2017) found that pre-play communication increases the 
dictator´s share allotted to the recipient in subsequent dictator games. The effect of 
communication on allocation behavior has also been studied in bargaining environments. Xiao 
and Houser (2005) conducted an ultimatum game that was extended to allow responders to ex-
post send a free written message to the proposer in case of acceptance of the allotted share. 
They found that rejection rates for small offers (20 percent of the pie or less) decreased 
significantly. The authors concluded that the possibility of displaying disapproval might be a 
satisfying form of retaliation that substitutes punishment by simply rejecting the offer. As a 
consequence, economic models started to integrate such preferences by attributing them to 
concerns of self-image (Bénabou et al., 2018; Bénabou and Tirole, 2006; Bodner and Prelec, 
2003; Grossman and van der Weele, 2017). That is, subjects trade off utility from material gains 
with potential disutility caused by deterioration of how they evaluate themselves. We contribute 
to this body of literature by experimentally examining how people manage the acquisition, or 
respectively avoidance, of information that is likely to affect their self-image. 
 In particular, we follow Grosskopf and López-Vargas (2014) and Langenbach (2016) with 
regard to the valuation of verbal feedback. Both examined recipients’ preferences for sending 
messages to an individual who previously affected them in an allocation decision. Grosskopf 
and López-Vargas (2014) used a power-to-take game and found a positive willingness-to-pay 
(WTP) for sending messages to the taker afterwards. Langenbach (2016) studied ex-ante and 
ex-post communication in dictator games and found that recipients exhibit a positive WTP for 
both types of communication. Based on that, our experiment fills an important gap by studying 
the opposite direction of those experiments. Specifically, instead of examining the recipients´ 
preferences to give feedback about the decision makers´ behavior, we shed light on the decision 
makers´ preferences to receive or to avoid feedback about his/her own behavior.  
 Following the literature on curiosity and self-image, we hypothesize that dictators who 
equally share with the responder will only exhibit a WTP for receiving feedback and not for 
avoiding. On the contrary, for dictators that behave selfishly in the allocation situation, we 
hypothesize that both acquisition and avoidance of feedback will be observed, as they have to 
trade off preferences for the satisfaction of curiosity with the desire to avoid the reception of 
social disapproval. 
 In accordance with our hypotheses, we find that most decision makers exhibit a positive 
WTP for having control about receiving or avoiding feedback. Precisely, egalitarian decision 
makers reveal a positive WTP for receiving, but not for avoiding feedback. By contrast, among 
selfish decision makers we identify a fraction that pays for getting as well as a fraction that pays 
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for avoiding feedback. Asking subjects about the underlying motives indicates that curiosity, 
the anticipation of social approval and a preference for giving the recipient the chance to express 
his/her feelings are the main driving forces for feedback acquisition. By contrast, the fear of 
receiving social disapproval as well as shame and guilt are the main motivations to avoid 
receiving feedback from the recipient. 
 
2. Experimental design, procedures and hypotheses 
2.1. Design 
At the beginning of the experiment, subjects were randomly assigned to the roles of dictators 
and recipients and subsequently matched in pairs.5 The interaction between subjects was 
performed in two stages. In the first stage, subjects played a MDG in which dictators had to 
decide how to allocate €10 between themselves and the respective recipient. Each dictator could 
choose between a “fair” allocation (€5 for the dictator and €5 for the recipient) and an “unfair” 
allocation (€8 for the dictator and €2 for the recipient).6 Participants took this decision, knowing 
that feedback could potentially be distributed. In the second stage of the experiment, the dictator 
determined whether the recipient was given the possibility to give verbal feedback to him/her 
or not. Specifically, subjects were informed that feedback would take the form of a verbal 
message written freely, formulated by the recipient after knowing about the outcome of the 
MDG, and transmitted subsequently to the dictator. We framed the potential occurrence of 
feedback as “a possibility for the recipient to express his/her thoughts and feelings about the 
dictator’s behavior in the previous allocation situation”. 
 We applied two treatments between subjects, pay to get and pay to avoid, in which we 
varied the status quo of feedback.7 In pay to get, the default was that dictators would not receive 
a message by the recipient and had to pay to get feedback. Vice versa, in pay to avoid, the 
default was that dictators would receive a message and had to pay if they wanted to avoid it. 
The actual price for getting or avoiding feedback was initially unknown and drawn from a 
uniform distribution between €0.00 and €1.00. To elicit the dictators´ WTP to get, or 
respectively, to avoid feedback, we used the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) method 
(Becker et al., 1964).8 For that purpose, all subjects were equipped with an endowment of €1 at 
 
5 Throughout the whole instructions, the role of the dictators was referred to as “Player A” and the role of the 
recipients as “Player B”. 
6 For the ease of reading this paper, we label subjects choosing the egalitarian option as “fair dictators” and subjects 
choosing the selfish option as “unfair dictators”. 
7 A control treatment where no feedback occurs is thus not necessary, as we are not primarily interested in the 
allocation behavior per se. 
8 The BDM is an incentive compatible method to measure a subject´s willingness-to-pay. 
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the beginning of the experiment. If the stated WTP was at least as high as the actual price, a 
switch from the status quo was implemented. In this case, the initial endowment was reduced 
by the price. Otherwise, the status quo remained unchanged and the subject did not incur any 
costs. 
 If feedback was enabled, the recipients had three minutes to write a verbal message, which 
was subsequently displayed on the dictators´ computer screen for another three minutes without 
the possibility to leave the stage or switch the screen. While recipients entitled to formulate 
feedback wrote their messages, the remaining recipients, as well as all the dictators, had to copy 
a small, neutral text. We implemented this for two reasons: First, we did not want to give the 
recipients the opportunity to express their feelings in any way, even if the message is not 
transmitted. Second, we wanted to make sure that it is not identifiable who formulates a message 
by the sound of typing. 
 To explore emotional changes between stages, we elicited levels of well-being and arousal 
at three points during the experiment using a 9-point SAM-scale from Bradley and Lang 
(1994).9 First, immediately after the experiment had begun, second, after the allocation 
decisions had been implemented and revealed, and third, after the messages had been written 
and received. Finally, at the end of the experiment, we asked the dictators about their motivation 
for their bidding behavior and simultaneously the recipients stated their beliefs about the 
underlying motivations of the dictator´s behavior. 
 
2.2. Procedures 
The experiment was computerized using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and run at the experimental 
laboratory of Heidelberg University. Participants were recruited using HROOT (Bock et al., 
2014) and we conducted fourteen sessions between June 2016 and November 2017 with a total 
of 234 subjects. 118 subjects (59 pairs) participated in pay to get and 116 (58 pairs) in pay to 
avoid. The average age was 23.26 years. 57% of the subjects were females and 27% of the 
participants studied in an economic field. A session took about 30 minutes and subjects earned 
€7.98 on average, including a show-up fee of €2.  
 
2.3. Hypotheses 
We derived our hypotheses based on the literature on curiosity and on self-image. This literature 
suggests that subjects exhibit an intrinsic demand to learn about the unknown, independently 
 
9 The SAM-scale is a pictorial, non-verbal measure to elicit different dimensions of emotions. See the appendix 
for the pictograms we used in the experiment. 
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from its content (Golman and Loewenstein, 2015; Laffont, 1989; Loewenstein, 1994). As a 
result, satisfying curiosity would always have a positive effect on the agent´s utility. We thus 
hypothesize that subjects are curious about the recipients´ reactions and we assume that 
curiosity is satisfied when feedback is given, and it remains unsatisfied when feedback is not 
given. Second, a growing body of evidence suggests that individuals like having a positive self-
image and dislike factors that threaten its maintenance (Bénabou and Tirole, 2006; Grossman 
and van der Weele, 2017; Loewenstein and Molnar, 2018). Consequently, they like (dislike) 
the reception of feedback, given that they expect it to contain social approval (disapproval). In 
the given setting, we assume that dictators anticipate receiving social approval when they 
behaved fairly in the allocation situation and that they anticipate receiving social disapproval, 
when they behaved selfishly. Consequently, agents prefer receiving feedback when they 
behaved fairly, and they prefer avoiding feedback, when they behaved selfishly. Based on these 
two strands of literature, we formulate Hypothesis 1, for fair dictators and Hypothesis 2 for 
unfair dictators. 
 Hypothesis 1. Fair dictators exhibit a positive WTP to get, but not to avoid feedback from 
the recipient. 
Hypothesis 1 reflects the idea that fair dictators exhibit a preference to satisfy their curiosity 
about the recipients’ reactions as well as a preference to receive social approval. We therefore 
expect that for fair dictators, these preferences translate into a positive WTP to get feedback. 
For those reasons, we expect no positive WTP to avoid feedback. 
 Hypothesis 2. Unfair dictators exhibit a positive WTP to get, and to avoid feedback from 
the recipient. 
Hypothesis 2 reflects the idea that unfair dictators trade off utility from satisfying their curiosity 
with the anticipated detrimental effects on self-image. That is, some of them will be more 
concerned with curiosity than with self-image and will therefore pay to receive feedback from 
the recipient. As a result, we expect a positive share of unfair dictators to exhibit a WTP to get 
feedback. On the other hand, there will be some, for which the anticipated effects on self-image 
are more important than the desire to satisfy their curiosity about the recipient’s reaction. We 
therefore hypothesize that among unfair dictators there will be a fraction of subjects that exhibit 
a positive WTP to avoid feedback. 
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3. Results 
3.1. Allocation behavior 
Overall, we had 117 dictators in both treatments. The dictators’ choices in the allocation stage 
do not differ between the two treatments (z = 0.455, p = 0.649, two-sided Mann-Whitney U test 
(MWU)). Moreover, we find overall no preference of one over the other allocation option (p = 
0.460, two-sided binomial test). By contrast, recipients expect the dictator to select the unfair 
option significantly more often (p < 0.001, two-sided binomial test). Conducting regression 
analyses on allocation behavior, including controls for gender and economics study subject, we 
find that only dictators studying economics choose the selfish allocation significantly more 
often (see Appendix, Table 6).  
 
3.2. Hypothesis testing 
We find that dictators exhibit a positive WTP for the reception of feedback in pay to get, 
independent of their choice in the allocation stage (Figure 1)10. This constitutes support for 
Hypotheses 1 and 2. Furthermore, the WTP does not differ between subjects that chose the fair 
or the unfair option (n = 59, z = -1.196, p = 0.232, MWU). In pay to avoid, we find that unfair 
dictators exhibit a positive WTP to avoid feedback, while we find no positive WTP to avoid 
feedback for fair dictators (Figure 1). This again supports Hypotheses 1 and 2. Furthermore, we 
find that unfair dictators exhibit a significantly higher WTP to avoid feedback compared to fair 
dictators (n = 58, z = 2.494, p = 0.013, MWU). Table 1 shows a regression, which supports our 
findings, while considering all control variables.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10 For all WTP’s in Figure 1 we also run one-sided t-tests, which were significant with p < 0.01, except for fair 
dictators in the pay to avoid treatment (p = 0.163). Nevertheless, due to the sample size, we focus on the confidence 
intervals to be a more reliable measurement. 
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Figure 1. WTP by Treatment and Decision 
 
Notes: Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals 
 
Table 1. Linear Regression on Willingness to Pay 
 Willingness to Pay p-values 
Pay-to-Get Treatment -5.415 0.432 
 (6.873)  
Fair Decision -14.520 0.026 
 (6.440)  
Pay-to-get Treatment X Fair Decision 26.404 0.003 
 (8.785)  
Well-Being -0.263 0.870 
 (1.600)  
Arousal 0.780 0.490 
 (1.127)  
Economist -0.061 0.990 
 (5.029)  
Male 5.431 0.252 
 (4.716)  
Constant 12.313 0.378 
 (13.901)  
Observations 117  
Notes: We report OLS model coefficient estimates with standard errors clustered on the individual level in 
parentheses. The dependent variable is the willingness-to-pay to either get or avoid feedback depending on the 
treatment by the dictators. Pay-to-Get Treatment is a dummy variable, which takes the value of 1 for the pay to 
get treatment and 0 for the pay to avoid treatment. Fair Decision is a dummy variable, which takes the value of 1 
if the dictator decided for the fair option and 0 if he decided for the unfair option. We control for the self-reported 
well-being level, the self-reported arousal level, participants studying economics and gender.  
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3.3. Exploratory analyses: Well-being and arousal 
We elicit emotional changes regarding well-being (negative/positive) and arousal (not 
excited/excited) using a 9-point SAM-scale three times during the experiment. We restrict our 
analysis to the first two elicitations to infer causal statements, which is, due to multiple paths, 
only possible to a limited extent afterwards11. Figure 1 depicts the results for well-being. At the 
beginning of the experiment, when we elicit well-being and arousal the first time, we find no 
differences between dictators and recipients (well-being: n = 234, z = -0.593, p = 0.553; arousal: 
n = 234, z = -0.670, p = 0.503, MWU). After the allocation stage is finished and allocations are 
revealed to recipients, the well-being of fair dictators significantly increases, while it 
significantly decreases for unfair dictators. Looking at the recipients, we find a significant 
increase in well-being, when dictators treated them fairly and a significant decrease, when 
treated unfairly. For the change in arousal, Figure 2 implies a significant decrease for fair 
dictators and a significant increase for recipients that were treated in an unfair way. 
 
Figure 2. Change of Well-Being 
 
Notes: Comparison of self-reported well-being level before and after the allocation decision. Assessment 
based on the 9-point SAM scale for well-being (negative-positive). Error bars indicate 95% confidence 
intervals; two-sided Sign test. 
 
11 Detailed regression analysis can be found in the online supplement. The analysis showed, except for a huge 
increase in well-being for fair dictators, which received feedback, only negligible insights.   
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Figure 3. Change of Arousal 
 
Notes: Comparison of self-reported arousal level before and after the allocation decision. Assessment 
based on the 9-point SAM scale for arousal (not excited-excited). Error bars indicate 95% confidence 
intervals; two-sided Sign test. 
 
3.4. Exploratory Analyses: Motivation for Bidding 
In both treatments, we ask dictators about the motives for their WTP as well as recipients about 
their beliefs about the dictators´ motives.12 The main motives stated in pay to get by fair 
dictators are curiosity (63%), the desire to give the recipient the possibility to express his/her 
feelings (36%) and the expectation to receive positive feedback (36%). The most frequently 
stated motives by unfair dictators for paying for receiving feedback are the desire to give the 
recipient the possibility to express his/her feelings (64%) and curiosity (55%). In pay to avoid 
the main motivation stated by unfair dictators are the expectation to receive negative feedback 
(83%) and feelings of shame or guilt (33%).13 Furthermore, we see that the beliefs of the 
recipients correspond to the actual motives stated by dictators.14 
  
 
12 Two research assistants evaluated the statements independently without knowing about the experiment or the 
hypotheses. For that purpose, we provided them with a list of motives that are relevant for the derivation of 
hypotheses and they then checked whether these motives were mentioned by participants. In addition, the 
evaluators could build new categories, when this was necessary. For the analysis, we apply a conservative approach 
by considering only those evaluations where both evaluators came to the same conclusion regarding a particular 
motive. Since we do not put any restrictions on the free text the content can be assigned to multiple categories, and 
no assignment can be possible. A complete list of all statements and sent messages, as well as the categorization 
by the student assistants can be found in the Appendix online. 
13 Only one fair dictator exhibited a positive WTP for avoidance, but the stated motivation for that behavior could 
not be categorized. 
14 Precisely, recipients matched with fair dictators also conjectured that curiosity (36%), the desire to give the 
recipient the possibility to express his/her feelings (9%) and the expectation to receive positive feedback (55%) 
are the main motives for feedback. Recipients of unfair feedback from dictators conjectured that the desire to give 
the recipient the possibility to express his/her feelings (46%) and curiosity (69%) will be the main motives.  
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3.5. Exploratory Analyses: Message Content 
In total, 58 messages were sent from recipients to dictators.15 Most messages sent to fair 
dictators contain positive feedback displaying appreciation for the choice in the allocation stage 
(85%). In addition, one recipient expresses understanding for the dictator´s behavior, stating 
that he would have made the same decision (4%). The messages sent to unfair dictators mainly 
contained negative feedback (66%). However, an appreciable minority states understanding for 
the dictators’ choice (20%).  
 
4. Discussion and Conclusion 
In summary, our results provide answers to our main research questions and hypotheses: First, 
both a significant fraction of fair dictators, but also of unfair dictators exhibit a positive 
willingness-to-pay to enable the recipient to give feedback in an allocation decision. Second, 
unfair dictators exhibit a willingness-to-pay to avoid feedback from their recipient, while this 
is not the case for fair dictators. These findings are consistent with our hypotheses.  
 Looking at the expectations of dictators regarding message content shows that our 
paradigm worked properly as dictators expected to receive social approval if they chose the fair 
option and social disapproval if they chose the unfair option. Second, we are confident that the 
WTP entered by dictators in the different constellations do not result from experimenter demand 
effects (Zizzo, 2010), as 27 out of 28 dictators who chose the fair option entered a WTP of zero 
for feedback avoidance. 
 The general demand for receiving feedback corroborates the importance of curiosity. 
Particularly, as this motive has been mentioned by the majority of fair as well as by the majority 
of unfair dictators, despite the fact that these two groups strongly differed regarding the 
expectations about the kind of feedback that they would receive. This is in accordance with 
literature that defines curiosity as an intrinsic demand to learn about the unknown, independent 
from its content (Golman and Loewenstein, 2015; Laffont, 1989; Loewenstein, 1994). We 
therefore complement this literature by identifying the importance of curiosity for an 
understanding of the demand for non-instrumental communication in allocation decisions. 
 Likewise, the fact that the demand for feedback decreases when dictators behave unfairly 
in the allocation decision is in accordance with models that assume individuals to trade off self-
image with other concerns, e.g., material outcome (Bénabou et al., 2018; Bénabou and Tirole, 
 
15 27 messages are sent to fair dictators and 31 to unfair dictators. The content is analyzed the same way as the 
motivations for the WTP in the previous section. Again, we only report what has been classified identically by the 
two research assistants. 
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2006; Bodner and Prelec, 2003; Grossman and van der Weele, 2017). We contribute to this 
literature by providing evidence that this trade-off also holds for non-material outcomes: our 
results suggest that individuals trade off the negative effect of information that potentially 
deteriorates self-image with the demand to satisfy curiosity by learning about the recipients’ 
actual reactions. 
 The exploratory analyses of changes in well-being and arousal shed further light on 
emotional development between the stages. For example, in fair dictators, we identify a 
significant increase in well-being, but a decrease in arousal. This could be interpreted as 
satisfaction for being “nice” to the recipient or behaving in a socially respected manner. For 
unfair dictators, we find the opposite with respect to well-being. This might be interpreted as a 
result from feelings of guilt. Looking at the recipients, we find that subjects matched with an 
unfair dictator perceive a large decrease in well-being. One plausible explanation for this 
observation could be disappointment about the dictator’s decision. Another possible 
explanation could be anger, which we nevertheless discard, since we do not find a significant 
increase in arousal.  
 We are aware that our experiment has some limitations. For example, some parts of the 
experiment are not incentivized, such as the elicitation of the recipients’ guesses or the 
dictators’ beliefs about the content of the messages. Furthermore, participants have been aware 
about the fact that feedback could potentially be distirbuted in the second stage. This might 
have had an effect on the allocation decision in the first stage, which in turn might have 
influenced the feedback decision in the second stage. As a result, dictators might have decided 
unfairly less often, compared to the situation where they would not have known about the 
upcoming feedback stage. This, however, should lead to an underestimation of the WTP for the 
avoidance of feedback, as those dictators whose self-image is especially vulnerable to negative 
feedback should be most prone to adapt their behavior in case of the presence of feedback. Such 
individuals would thus depend particularly strong on mechanisms that help them to avoid 
deterioration of self-image. In addition, the setting is consistent with most field situations as 
individuals mostly have the possibility to either self-select into environments with a particular 
feedback structure (i.e., feedback exists or not) or can adapt behavior depending on the structure 
of feedback that is present in a specific context.  
 We see three avenues for future research. First, it might be useful to take a closer look at 
the relative importance of the motives underlying the decision to receive or avoid feedback. 
Although our experiments identified the importance of each of the examined motives, our data 
does not allow to draw precise conclusions about the relative importance of the competing 
13 
 
motives. Further research on how people trade off motives such as curiosity and avoiding social 
disapproval could help understanding social interactions to a higher degree. Second, it might 
be interesting to shed further light on the desire to give the recipient the possibility for 
expression, a desire that has been mentioned both by fair and unfair dictators, i.e., independently 
from the expected content of the message. Third, given the results from Xiao and Houser (2007) 
and Ellingsen and Johannesson (2008) on the effects of costless post-decision messages on 
dictator giving, it might be interesting to study whether the effects of feedback on the dictator's 
decision change when dictators take a costly decision about the feedback option. 
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A Appendix 
Table 2. Dictators‘ WTP by Allocation Choice 
  Fair 
Dictators 
(n=54) 
Unfair 
Dictators 
(n=63) 
Test for difference in 
mean/median 
Pay to Get 
(n=59) 
Observations 26 33  
WTP 15/26 15/33 p = 0.435, 
Fisher’s exact test Share (WTP > 0) 58% 45% 
Avg. WTP in € 0.22  
(0.32) 
0.11  
(0.14) 
z = -1.196, 
p = 0.232, 
MWU 
Avg. WTP in € 
(conditional on WTP>0) 
0.38  
(0.33) 
0.23  
(0.13) 
z = -0.875, 
p = 0.382, 
MWU 
Pay to 
Avoid 
(n=58) 
Observations 28 30  
WTP 1/28 8/30 p = 0.026, 
Fisher’s exact test Share (WTP > 0) 4% 27% 
Avg. WTP 0.00  
(0.02) 
0.17  
(0.32) 
z = 2.494, 
p = 0.013, 
MWU 
Avg. WTP in € 
(conditional on  
WTP > 0) 
0.10  
(n.a.) 
0.62  
(0.32) 
z = 1.556, 
p = 0.120, 
MWU 
Notes: All reported tests are two-sided. Standard error in parenthesis. 
 
Table 3. Dictators‘ WTP by Treatment 
  Pay to Get 
(n=59) 
Pay to 
Avoid 
(n=58) 
Test for difference in 
mean/median 
Fair 
Dictators 
(n=54) 
Observations 26 28  
WTP 15/26 1/28 p < 0.001, Fisher’s 
exact test Share (WTP > 0) 58% 4% 
Avg. WTP in € 0.22  
(0.32) 
0.00  
(0.02) 
z = -4.290,  
p < 0.001, MWU 
Avg. WTP in € 
(conditional on WTP>0) 
0.38  
(0.33) 
0.10  
(n.a.) 
z = -0.654,  
p = 0.513, 
MWU 
Unfair 
Dictators 
(n=63) 
Observations 33 30  
WTP 15/33 8/30 p < 0.001, 
Fisher’s exact test Share (WTP > 0) 45% 27% 
Avg. WTP 0.11  
(0.14) 
0.17  
(0.32) 
z = -0.766, 
 p = 0.444,  
MWU 
Avg. WTP in € 
(conditional on  
WTP > 0) 
0.23  
(0.13) 
0.62  
(0.32) 
z = 2.919,  
p = 0.004,  
MWU 
Notes: All reported tests are two-sided. Standard error in parenthesis. 
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Table 4. Recipients‘ beliefs about dictators WTP by Treatment 
 
 Pay to Get 
(n=59) 
Pay to 
Avoid 
(n=58) 
Test for difference in 
mean/median 
Expected 
Fair 
Dictator 
Behavior 
(n=54) 
Observations 21 20  
WTP 11/21 15/20 p = 0.197 
Fisher’s exact test Share (WTP > 0) 52% 75% 
Avg. WTP in € 0.18  
(0.26) 
0.32  
(0.31) 
z = 1.812, 
p = 0.070, 
MWU 
Avg. WTP in € 
(conditional on WTP>0) 
0.34  
(0.28) 
0.42  
(0.28) 
z = 1.053, 
p = 0.292, 
MWU 
Expected 
Unfair 
Dictator 
Behavior 
(n=63) 
Observations 38 38  
WTP 22/38 17/38 p = 0.359 
Fisher’s exact test Share (WTP > 0) 66% 45% 
Avg. WTP 0.20  
(0.26) 
0.21  
(0.30) 
z = -0.348, 
p = 0.728, 
MWU 
Avg. WTP in € 
(conditional on  
WTP > 0) 
0.35  
(0.25) 
0.47  
(0.27) 
z = 1.818, 
p = 0.069, 
MWU 
Notes: All reported tests are two-sided. Standard error in parenthesis. 
 
Table 5. Recipients‘ beliefs about dictators WTP by Allocation Choice 
  Fair 
Dictators 
(n=54) 
Unfair 
Dictators 
(n=63) 
Test for difference in 
mean/median 
Pay to Get 
(n=59) 
Observations 21 38  
WTP 11/21 22/38 p = 0.786 
Fisher’s exact test Share (WTP > 0) 52% 66% 
Avg. WTP in € 0.18 
(0.26) 
0.20 
(0.26) 
z = 0.448, 
p = 0.654, 
MWU 
Avg. WTP in € 
(conditional on WTP>0) 
0.34 
(0.28) 
0.35 
(0.25) 
z = 0.193, 
p = 0.847, 
MWU 
Pay to 
Avoid 
(n=58) 
Observations 20 38  
WTP 15/20 17/38 p = 0.051 
Fisher’s exact test Share (WTP > 0) 75% 45% 
Avg. WTP 0.32 
(0.31) 
0.21 
(0.30) 
z = -1.754, 
p = 0.080, 
MWU 
Avg. WTP in € 
(conditional on  
WTP > 0) 
0.42 
(0.28) 
0.47 
(0.27) 
z = 0.498, 
p = 0.619, 
MWU 
Notes: All reported tests are two-sided. Standard error in parenthesis. 
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Table 6. Probit Regression on Fair Decision 
 Fair Decision p-values 
Pay-to-Get Treatment -0.143 0.555 
 (0.241)  
Well-Being -0.043 0.606 
 (0.084)  
Arousal -0.028 0.675 
 (0.067)  
Economist -0.627 0.031 
 (0.291)  
Male -0.423 0.081 
 (0.242)  
Constant 0.689 0.302 
 (0.668)  
Observations 117  
Notes: We report probit model coefficient estimates with standard errors clustered on the individual level in 
parentheses. The dependent variable is the decision for the fair outcome by the dictators. We control for the two 
different treatments, participants studying economics and gender.  
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B Online Appendix: Instructions and Raw Data 
The German version and an English translation of the instructions can be found online at (set 
up after publication, see supplemental files). The repository also includes the raw data, and also 
a replication code to generate the analysis and tables presented in this paper. 
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